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ABSTRACT
Citibank made front page news for reasons it would rather have avoided when
it mistakenly transferred $900 million of its own money to creditors of Revlon. When
Citibank discovered the error the next day, it asked (initially politely then less so)
for the creditors to return the mistaken payment. Several creditors refused and
Citibank was forced to initiate litigation to attempt to get the money returned. This
litigation is ongoing, but the first round of the battle was won by the lenders when a
federal district court ruled that they had a legal right to retain Citibank’s mistaken
payment under the “discharge for value” defense. This Article briefly reviews the
facts and the opinion of that case. On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed that
decision and held for Citibank thereby requiring the lenders to return Citibank’s
money. This piece also reviews that opinion. The primary and original contribution
of the piece, however, is to discuss the tax aspects of all the possible outcomes. While
some tax consequences are straightforward, there are several interesting and less
certain tax results that could apply to all three parties (Citibank, Revlon, and the
lenders). This Article will explain those possibilities and review the tax doctrines
that will apply once Citibank’s litigation has concluded.

† Harry M. Walborsky Professor and Associ ate D ean for Business Law Progr ams ,
Florida State University College of Law. The author wishes to thank Rebecca Maturo for
her h elpful r esearch and comments on this piece. Also , th anks to Pr ofessor Stev e Johnson
for his helpful comments and suggestions to this piece.
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INTRODUCTION
To err is human, but the Internal Revenue Service is not divine, so
it does not forgive.1 While everyone makes mistakes, the tax treatment of
a transaction generally does not change whether the transaction was done
purposely or accidentally or under a mistaken belief. 2 For example,
assume Alvin owed a debt to Barbara, but that debt had expired so there
is no longer a legal obligation for Alvin to pay the debt. Alvin, however,
is under the mistaken belief that he still is required to pay, and therefore
he makes the payment. The tax treatment to both Alvin and Barbara of
that transaction does not change whether Alvin was under a mistaken
impression or not. In either case, the transaction will merely be treated as
Alvin satisfying his debt and the appropriate tax consequences will
apply.3
With apologies to the spirit of Alexander Pope.
One small caveat to this is that if a taxpayer engages in a transaction (purposely), but with
the principal purpose of obtaining beneficial tax treatment rather than a genuine business purpose,
courts may ignore the form of the transaction and instead apply the appropriate tax results to the
substance. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). That is to say that the tax results of a
transaction can change based on whether there is an actual business purpose to that transaction.
3 In this example, there is no income to Barbara (she is merely receiving back what she loaned
out) and no deduction to Alvin. This treatment mirrors the tax treatment of the initial loan, which
also provides no income to the recipient of the loan and no deduction for the lender. Since there is
no accession of wealth for either the person receiving the loan or the creditor when the loan is paid
off, there is no income. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (defining
income as “accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete
1
2
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Many mistakes are harmless, but sometimes they are so large that
they end up in the news, in court, or both. In Part I, this Article will review
the $900 million mistake that Citibank made in 2020.4 Not surprisingly,
a mistake involving that much money led to both news coverage and
litigation, the latter of which this piece will review. In Part II, this Article
will discuss the possible income tax consequences (at both the time of the
mistake and once the litigation is completed) for all of the parties
involved in the Citibank transaction. As most of the commentary has
focused on the corporate and contract law elements of the Citibank
mistake, the important income tax consequences have so far been
ignored. This is the first piece to review and comment on the tax elements
of the transaction and its fallout.
I. IN RE CITIBANK
A.

Facts

In 2016, Revlon, Inc., a U.S. cosmetics corporation, borrowed $1.8
billion.5 Citibank served as “administrative agent” for that loan. One of
its duties as administrative agent was to receive payments from Revlon
and pass those on to the lenders of the loan.6 In 2020, Citibank, still acting
as Revlon’s administrative agent, made a gigantic and costly error. It
wired not only the funds that Citibank had received from Revlon (around
$7.8 million), but it also wired $900 million of its own money to the
lenders.7 Apparently, Citibank had intended to send the $7.8 million it
received from Revlon to Revlon’s creditors and transfer $900 million or
so of its own money to an internal Citibank “wash account.”8 These types
of accounts were used internally to safeguard against the money leaving
the bank. When approving the transfer, Citibank’s employees believed
that the $900 million was being transferred to these Citibank internal

dominion”). While this conclusion has never been codified, common law has consistently followed
such treatment. See DOUGLAS A. KAHN & JEFFREY H. KAHN, FEDERAL INCOME TAX—A GUIDE
TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 141 (8th ed. 2019).
4 Stacy Cowley, Citi Loses Its Bid to Reclaim Cash from a $900 Million Mistake, NY TIMES
(Feb. 16, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/16/business/citibank-revlon-loan.html
[https://perma.cc/XF3M-26B2].
5 In re Citibank August 11, 2020 Wire Transfers, 520 F.Supp.3d 390, 397 (S.D.N.Y 2021),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Citibank, N.A. v. Brigade Cap. Mgmt., LP, 49 F.4th 42 (2d Cir.
2022). The loan enabled Revlon to purchase Elizabeth Arden, Inc., another cosmetics company, for
$900 million cash. Eric Talley, Discharging the Discharge-For-Value Defense, 18 N.Y.U. J.L. &
BUS. 147, 157 (2021).
6 In re Citibank, 520 F. Supp. 3d at 397.
7 Id. at 396.
8 Id. at 401.

174

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE NOVO

[Vol. 44

accounts but instead it was sent to Revlon’s lenders.9 This mistaken
transfer ended up paying off the entirety of the remaining 2016 loan10
(the original loan agreement was set to mature in September of 2023). 11
After it discovered the error the next day, Citibank contacted the
lenders (several times) to notify them of the mistake and asked for them
to return the extra payments. The first email was fairly polite: “[p]lease
return the principal portion of the payment you received . . . as soon as
possible.”12 The third email sent a few days later was less friendly:
To be clear, these funds belong solely to Citibank; they are not
borrower or Revlon 2016 Term Loan facility funds. In view of this
mistaken transfer, you are legally obligated to return those funds and,
as is standard industry practice when fund transfers occur mistakenly,
we expect that you will return those funds to Citibank immediately.13

Although some of the funds were returned, several of the lenders
refused to send anything back to Citibank.14 Apparently, the lenders
themselves were “hours away from launching a long-shot lawsuit of their
own against Revlon and Citibank, seeking to recover the precise sum that
had just (miraculously) fallen into their laps.”15 Several of the lenders
believed that certain transactions engaged in by Revlon violated the terms
of the initial loan agreement and thus caused that loan to be in default.16
In their opinion, this alleged default required Revlon to accelerate the
repayment of their loan.17
In late 2020, Citibank began litigation to force those lenders to return
the money that Citibank paid from its own funds. At issue in the case was
more than $500 million of the original $900 million payment.18 Citibank
had a fairly simple argument—the money was sent by mistake. It does
not belong to the lenders; it belongs to Citibank and therefore the lenders
were required to return it to Citibank. Legally, Citibank argued
“conversion, unjust enrichment, money had and received, and payment
by mistake.”19 Essentially, Citibank’s arguments under all four legal
claims boiled down to equity—the defendants received a benefit that they

9
10
11
12
13
14

Id. at 400–04.
Id. at 405.
Id. at 398.
Id. at 405 (alteration in original).
Id.
The lenders who refused held approximately $500 million of the mistaken payment. Id. at

396.
15 Talley, supra note 5, at 150. The lenders likely could not believe their luck in recovering the
entire loan amount as the loans were trading at a sixty percent discount in March 2020. Id. at 159.
16 Id. at 160–62.
17 In re Citibank, 520 F. Supp. 3d at 409.
18 Id. at 398.
19 Id. at 413.
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did not deserve and therefore they needed to give it back. There was no
dispute about the facts; it was clear that this was Citibank’s money and it
was sent in error. Without something else, the case seemed fairly cut and
dry.20
Still, to the surprise of many, Judge Jess Furman of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York held for the lenders,
ruling that they were allowed to keep the funds.21 Judge Furman used the
State of New York’s “discharge for value” defense to provide the lenders
a win.22 The court held this defense was valid to offset each of Citibank’s
legal claims.
B.

Discharge-for-Value Defense

The “discharge for value” defense is an exception to the general
equitable rule that a person must return what does not belong to them.
The general rule of having a duty to return what does not belong to you
applies even when the payor was negligent in making the mistaken
payment.23 Courts, again following general rules of equity, carved out
some exceptions to this general principle. Essentially, courts asked
whether there was an equitable justification to allow the payee to keep
the mistaken payment. That is, would it be even more “unfair” to force
the return? For example, if the recipient was reasonably unaware that the
payment was a mistake and had changed its position in reliance on the
payment, a court might find that it was not required to return the funds.24
If this is where the exception to the general equitable rule remained,
it is unlikely that the lenders in the Citibank case would have won. There
20 The lenders attempted to argue that they did not have control over or benefit from the
transferred funds and therefore the legal elements of conversion or payment by mistake were not
met. Id. at 414. As discussed in more detail in Section II.B–II.C, the court did not make a
determination on this (seemingly weak) argument because it used the affirmative defense of
discharge-for-value to decide the case in favor of the lenders.
21 Id. at 396.
22 Id. at 397.
23 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 6 (AM. L. INST. 2011)
(“As in other cases of benefit conferred by mistake, the fact that the claimant may have acted
negligently in making a mistaken payment is normally irrelevant to the analysis of the claim.”).
24 Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. State, 285 N.E.2d 695, 697–98 (N.Y. 1972); see also Mayer
v. New York, 63 N.Y. 455, 457 (1875) (“The general rule that money paid under a mistake of a
material fact may be recovered back [sic], although there was negligence on the part of the person
making the payment, is subject to the qualification that the payment cannot be recalled when the
position of the party receiving it has been changed in consequence of the payment, and it would be
inequitable to allow a recovery. The person making the payment must, in that case, bear the loss
occasioned by his own negligence.”). This general rule does not appear to apply to the Internal
Revenue Service. See Robert W. Wood, IRS Can Issue Tax Refunds, Then Demand Them Back with
Interest, FORBES (June 1, 2017) https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2017/06/01/irs-canissue-tax-refunds-then-demand-them-back-with-interest [https://perma.cc/2DSP-VANU].
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do not appear to be any facts to suggest that the lenders could meet a legal
requirement of detrimental reliance. The Restatement of Restitution,
however, adopted a more lenient position. Instead of having to show
detrimental reliance, the lender merely needed to show that it had not
made any “misrepresentation and did not have notice of the transferor’s
mistake.”25 Well before the Citibank mishap, there had been some
question whether New York had adopted the more liberal view of this
exception.26 In the 1991 Banque Worms case, the New York Court of
Appeals (New York’s highest state court) unanimously held that the
“discharge for value” exception was accepted law in the state and so the
more liberal version of the exception was settled law in New York. 27
C.

Did the Lenders Have Notice?

Therefore, the issue in Citibank was whether the liberal dischargefor-value doctrine applied to the lenders. Citibank attempted to argue
certain technical points about the doctrine that would strengthen its case.
For example, Citibank argued that (1) the doctrine only applies when the
debt is “due,”28 and (2) the question of notice is evaluated not when the
payment is made but instead when the payment is credited. 29 The federal
district court dismissed both of these arguments.
In the end, the ultimate determination in the case was whether the
lenders had notice that the payment was a mistake. Still, before that
determination could be made, the court also had to determine what the
standard of notice was.30 That is, the two sides disagreed on whether
actual notice was required or if constructive notice would suffice. Not
surprisingly, Citibank took the position that constructive notice was all
that was required, while the lenders argued for a standard of actual
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 14 (AM. L. INST. 1937).
Banque Worms v. BankAmerica Int’l, 570 N.E.2d 189, 193 (N.Y. 1991) (“[O]ne may
find . . . language in a myriad of cases that arguably lends support to the proposition that New York,
long ago, embraced the ‘discharge for value’ rule’ . . . . On the other hand, cases can also be cited
where the language employed supports the contrary view—that New York not only eschews the
‘discharge for value’ rule . . . but also embraces exclusively the detrimental reliance rule-mistake
of fact doctrine . . . .” (citations omitted)).
27 Id.
28 In re Citibank, 520 F. Supp. 3d 390, 419–21 (S.D.N.Y 2021). Using this argument, Citibank
contended that the discharge-for-value defense could not apply to their mistake since the full
payment of the loan was not due for another three years. Id. We will see that this argument ended
up succeeding on appeal.
29 Id. at 421–25. Citibank contended that the appropriate time to determine whether the
discharge-for-value defense applied was not upon the immediate receipt of the mistaken funds, but
instead when the payment is “credited” to the debtor’s account. Id.
30 Id. at 425 (“The final legal issue in dispute is what kind of notice prevents an assertion of the
discharge-for-value defense.”).
25
26
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knowledge.31 The court, reviewing both the opinions of other courts and
the Restatement, held that constructive notice was the appropriate
standard.32 Since actual notice was not met in the case, the final
determinative issue came down to whether the lenders had constructive
notice that the large payment from Citibank was made in error.
The court held that several factors supported the contention that the
lenders did not have constructive notice that the payment was in error.
The court noted that no payment was due on the date of the transfer. 33 So
the lenders were not expecting any payment, including a payment of a
much smaller variety. It would have been a better case for Citibank if a
$7–8 million payment was due and instead the much larger payment was
made. This lack of payment due supported the argument that it was
reasonable for the lenders to believe this was merely a prepayment of the
loan principal—something that Revlon was specifically allowed to do
according to the loan contract with the lenders.
The court also noted that it was reasonable for the lenders to believe
that the payment was intentional because it was for the exact amount of
the loan.34 The typical “fat finger” mistake is more obvious—more than
the amount due is paid or a decimal point is clearly in the wrong spot.
Since it was the exact amount due, it again supported the idea that Revlon
was paying off the loan early. The court also noted that a prepayment of
the loan was a much more likely explanation than a mistake.35 The lenders
knew Citibank had significant and rigorous procedures to ensure this type
of mistake did not occur. In fact, the court noted this was a “black swan”
event.36 It was difficult, if not impossible, to think of another mistaken
transfer involving so much money. It was again more reasonable for the
lenders to believe this payment was on purpose rather than some slip-up
that made it through all of Citibank’s verification checks.
Finally, the court noted that the lenders acted as if this was an
intentional payment. All communication by the lenders, prior to the first
Citibank email, suggested that the lenders believed it was an intentional
full satisfaction of the loan.37 It is only after they received the email from
Id. at 427.
Id. at 430.
33 Id. at 434 (“Critically, August 11, 2020, was not a scheduled interest payment date; the next
scheduled interest payment date was not until August 28, 2020.”).
34 Id. at 432 (“[T]he amounts received matched—to the penny—the amounts of principal and
interest outstanding on the 2016 Term Loan for each Lender as of August 11, 2020.”).
35 Id. at 433 (“[A]s surprising as an apparent early paydown from Revlon may (or should) have
been . . . that explanation for the wire transfers was far more plausible than the alternative
explanation (accurate though it turned out it be): that Citibank or Revlon had wired nearly $1 billion
by mistake. Citibank is one of the most sophisticated financial institutions in the world.”).
36 Id. at 434.
37 Id. at 435. The court cites several examples of the contemporaneous communications that
occurred by the lenders including an email from an Allstate employee stating “Please see holdings
31
32
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Citibank disclosing the mistake that the lenders began to remark on the
uniqueness of the situation.38 Since the appropriate time to judge whether
the lenders had notice was at the time of receipt (and thus before any of
the Citibank emails were received), this supported the case that the
lenders did not think the payment was in error. All these factors led the
court to find that the discharge-for-value defense was met.
D.

The Second Circuit Reverses

Not surprisingly, Citibank appealed the decision of the federal
district court and many believed that it would be reversed. 39 Those
predictions proved to be prescient recently when the Second Circuit
vacated the district court’s opinion and held for Citibank. 40
The Second Circuit began its opinion by noting that there was no
factual dispute and set out the same recitation of facts as those provided
by Judge Furman’s district court opinion. Like that opinion, the Second
Circuit agreed that the key issue in the case was whether the dischargefor-value defense applied and the key New York precedent was the
Banque Worms case. 41
Again, the ultimate issue for the Second Circuit to determine was
whether the lenders had notice that the payment was a mistake. While at
the district court the lenders argued that only actual notice would suffice,
Judge Furman rejected that contention and held that constructive notice
would also disqualify the discharge-for-value defense. The lenders did
not challenge that portion of the lower court decision.42 Instead, the two
sides disagreed on how to define “constructive notice.” The lenders
argued that “constructive notice is evaluated by asking what the

and cash received on 8/11. The cash description noted Revlon, and the amounts appear to tie to a
full paydown with interest.” Id.
38 Id. at 437. The court includes some of the “colorful” communications after the lenders
discovered the mistake, including an HPS Investment Partners, LLC employee writing “I feel really
bad for the person that fat fingered a $900mm erroneous payment. Not a great career
move . . . . How was work today honey? It was ok, except I accidentally sent $900mm out to people
who weren’t supposed to have it . . .” Id. A different HPS Investment employee described it simply
and succinctly as an “epic fail.” Id.
39 See Talley, supra note 5, at 172 (“[T]here is by now no shortage of discussion among
academics and practitioners about the Citibank holding—much of it critical . . . .”). Professor
Talley’s article not only points to several doctrinal and logic problems in the opinion, but it also
reviews the response from the market to the case. Professor Talley finds an almost immediate
reaction to the news of the mistake by firms in the lending space to include language rejecting the
Citibank result. Talley, supra note 5, at 218.
40 Citibank, N.A. v. Brigade Cap. Mgmt., LP, 49 F.4th 42 (2d Cir. 2022).
41 Banque Worms v. BankAmerica Int’l, 570 N.E.2d 189 (N.Y. 1991).
42 Citibank, N.A., 49 F.4th 42, at 61 n.11.

2022]

A TAXING MISTAKE

179

transferee ‘knew or should have known’ of the transferor’s mistake.” 43
Citibank, on the other hand, argued that constructive notice under New
York law also required a duty of inquiry if the facts were such that a
reasonable party would question whether there was a mistaken
payment.44
The Second Circuit agreed with Citibank, citing both New York
precedent and the Restatement. The lenders tried to counter that such
interpretation was inconsistent with the Banque Worms decision.45 The
Second Circuit disagreed by holding that the standard of notice was not
at issue in that case because there was “no reason whatsoever to suspect
that there was a mistake. The standard of notice had no bearing on that
case.”46 The court succinctly concluded that “In sum, we find it clear that
inquiry notice is the applicable notice standard in adjudicating a
discharge-for-value defense in New York.”47
Under this standard, when does a lender need to make an inquiry to
verify that the payments were not a mistake? The Second Circuit held that
the standard is one of reasonableness.48 If there are red flags about a
payment that should raise suspicions or warnings about whether a
payment was made by mistake, the standard is whether a reasonable
person would make an inquiry to ensure that the payments were not a
mistake. The Second Circuit, noting that the lenders have little incentive
to make that inquiry since it could result in them having the return the
money, instead applied the reasonableness standard to a hypothetical
person who would suffer a loss if the payments turned out to be a mistake
and therefore has an interest to ensure its validity.49
With that standard in mind, the Second Circuit reviewed whether
red flags existed in the Citibank payment that should have raised
suspicion or doubt thereby requiring the lenders to inquire whether it was
a mistake.50 The Second Circuit emphasized several items to support its
conclusion that the lenders should have realized something was amiss.
First, the court noted that there was no prior notice of a prepayment. 51
Under the loan contract, Citibank was required to provide prior notice if
Revlon planned to prepay any principal of the loan. 52 Noting that Citibank
was one of “the most sophisticated financial institutions in the world,”

43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Id. at 61.
Id.
Id. at 63.
Id.
Id. at 64.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 65–72.
Id. at 65.
Id.
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something that the district court used to support its conclusion that the
lenders could assume the payment was not a mistake, the Second Circuit
used this fact to support the conclusion that Citibank would not have sent
the payment without the appropriate and required notice.
Second, the Second Circuit noted that Revlon’s well-known
financial difficulties also suggested that the payment should have been
viewed with suspicion.53 The appeals court held that it should have been
considered astonishing that an essentially insolvent company would find
the resources to fully pay off the debt.54 The appeals court further noted
that, on account of Revlon’s financial problems, the debt was trading at
20–30 cents on the dollar.55 Why would Revlon pay the debt back in full
when it could have much more cheaply purchased the debt back for a
major discount? Once again, the court believed this should have raised
red flags to the lenders.
Finally, the court noted that Revlon had made an exchange offer to
the lenders just four days prior to the Citibank payment.56 The purpose of
that offer was to avoid an acceleration of the principal payment due under
the loan.57 The Second Circuit considered this another red flag as it should
have raised the question why Revlon would try to avoid payment
acceleration if it planned to repay the entire loan four days later.
The Second Circuit stated that it believed the district court
incorrectly applied the appropriate test to determine whether the lenders
believed that the payment was made by mistake. The court stated:
The test is not whether the recipient of the mistaken payment
reasonably believed that the payment was genuine and not the result
of mistake. The test is whether a prudent person, who faced some
likelihood of avoidable loss if the receipt of funds proved illusory,
would have seen fit in light of the warning signs to make reasonable
inquiry in the interest of avoiding that risk of loss. In other words,
when the information available to the recipient of an apparent
repayment includes facts supporting a reasonable suspicion of
mistake, the question is not whether the recipient reasonably believed
the payment was valid. It is whether a reasonably prudent investor,
focusing on all the available information (some supporting the
validity, some supporting doubts) who would be at risk of an avoidable
loss if the payment proved illusory, would have found the factors
supporting doubt sufficiently troublesome in the mix to warrant
making reasonable inquiry, in which case the recipient would be
chargeable with the knowledge that such reasonable inquiry would

Id. at 65–66.
Id.
55 Id. at 66.
56 Id.
57 Id.
53
54
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have revealed. It is an objective test, not dependent on what the actual
recipient believed.58

Having concluded that this collection of red flags raised enough
concern that the lenders had a duty to inquire, the Second Circuit also
concluded that a reasonable inquiry would have easily brought the
mistake to light.59 The court held “A payee who failed to call Citibank or
Revlon, but relied instead on nothing more than ascertaining that the
payment matched the debt, could not be said to have conducted a
reasonable investigation.”60
The Second Circuit made one final point supporting its decision to
reverse the lenders’ victory. The court held that Banque Worms was
distinguishable from the current controversy because in Banque Worms
the lenders were actually entitled to the money that they had received.61
In this case, since the debt was not due for another three years, the court
held that the lenders were not entitled to the payment. The Second Circuit
stated that there are “significant reasons” why restitution is important
when a mistaken payment is made.62 It noted that in this case, should the
court find an exception to the normal case of restitution, it would provide
a large windfall to the lenders.63 Whereas the doctrine of restitution would
“leave them exactly where they contracted to be.”64
The lenders argued that Banque Worms stressed the importance of
“finality of wire transfers,” but the Second Circuit did not believe the case
stood to mean that finality should trump all other policy considerations. 65
The court noted that Banque Worms was an exception to the general rule
of restitution and the importance of finality of wire transfers did not alter
the fact that allowing recipients to receive mistaken payments was the
exception, not the rule. Therefore, the court held that the discharge-forvalue defense had an entitlement requirement and the lenders in the
Citibank mistake did not meet that requirement since the loan was not
due for another three years. This conclusion meant that the lenders could
not use the discharge-for-value defense.

58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Id. at 68.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 74.
Id.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 77.
Id.
Id. at 78.
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II. TAXING THE MISTAKE
Whatever the final outcome, there are interesting questions
regarding the tax results to the involved parties. This Part will review the
possible federal income tax consequences to the lenders, Citibank, and
Revlon whatever the final conclusion of the case is.
A.

Initial Tax Treatment

All three of the parties involved in this dispute did not get to wait
until the final conclusion of the controversy before they had to report the
initial tax consequences of the mistake. Taxes are filed on an annual basis
and therefore all three parties should have reported their income based on
the situation as it was at the end of the tax year of the mistake. At that
point, the lenders had the money and refused to return it to Citibank.
For the lenders, their initial tax position was fairly simple. Since the
payments represented loan principal, the lenders merely received back
what they originally loaned out. Therefore, they did not recognize any
income for receiving those funds from Citibank.66 The only possible
exception to this was some small portion of the payment representing
interest. That amount would be income to the lenders, even though they
discovered that there was a possibility that the lenders would have to
return the money if Citibank sued and a court forced them to return the
mistaken payment.67 It makes no difference for tax purposes that the
payment was a mistake (or that the payor was someone other than
Revlon). The funds were clearly tied to the Revlon loan and of course the
lenders all took the position that they believed the funds were paying off
the loan under the discharge-for-value defense. 68
There is a bit more complexity (and some uncertainty) for the
original tax treatment of Citibank and Revlon. One issue that needed
resolution was the status of the debt obligation for Citibank and Revlon
on account of the mistaken payment. One possible contractual result was
that subrogation applied and Citibank stepped into the shoes of the
lenders. Subrogation has been described as a “legal fiction through which
one, who . . . pays the debt of another, is substituted to all the rights and
remedies of the other, and the debt is treated in equity as still existing for

See supra note 3.
This treatment illustrates the inclusion aspect of the “claim of right” doctrine. Under that
doctrine, if the taxpayer “acquired the property without a consensual recognition (express or
implied) of an obligation to repay and without restriction as to his disposition of the property” then
the taxpayer recognizes the receipt as income. See KAHN & KAHN, supra note 3, at 175–76.
68 In re Citibank, 520 F.Supp.3d 390, 396 (S.D.N.Y 2021).
66
67
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his benefit.”69 Under that treatment, Revlon would owe money to
Citibank under the same terms that it originally owed the lenders who
were mistakenly paid off by Citibank.
If, after the mistaken payment, Revlon continued paying back the
loan, just to Citibank and not the lenders, then for tax purposes there
really would not be much difference to the two parties. Revlon would get
a deduction for the interest payments that it accrues, 70 but not for the
payment of principal.71 Citibank would have income for the interest, but
the principal payments would be return of capital and therefore not
income.72
Of course, if Revlon has the financial wherewithal to pay back the
loan, it is less clear why Citibank would go through the trouble of suing
the original lenders who refused to return Citibank’s mistaken payment.
The interest rate on the original loan may be lower than what Citibank
could earn if it had the money (not unlikely with the rate increases of
late), but the more likely explanation is that Revlon does not have the
financial means to fully pay back the loan. Part of the reason the lenders
refused to return the money was their concern about Revlon’s financial
position.73 If that was part of Citibank’s justification for suing the lenders
to force them to return the money, it was well founded since Revlon filed
for bankruptcy under Chapter 11.74
So there are two possibilities here: either Revlon began to pay
Citibank back what it originally owed the lenders or it did not. As noted
above, if Revlon paid Citibank back, the tax consequences are simple—
neither Citibank nor Revlon will have any income tax consequences for
the payment of the loan principal. There will be no income to Citibank
and no deduction for Revlon for those loan principal payments. Any
interest payments will be income to Citibank and will be deductible by
Revlon.75
The latter possibility (Revlon not paying Citibank anything) may
have occurred for two distinct reasons. First, it is possible that Revlon
does not have the financial means to pay back the loan on account of its
insolvent position. Second, Revlon may take the position that it is not
actually required to pay Citibank back at all. That is, Revlon may argue
that subrogation does not apply. Citibank paid off Revlon’s loan and that

Home Owners’ Loan Corp. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 193 A. 769, 772 (Conn. 1937).
I.R.C. § 163.
71 See supra note 3.
72 Id.
73 Talley, supra note 5, at 150.
74 Jacqueline Ganun, Revlon Files for Bankruptcy Amid Competition and Supply Chain Stress,
NPR (June 16, 2022, 11:57 AM) https://www.npr.org/2022/06/16/1105490036/revlon-bankruptcy
[https://perma.cc/UFJ2-98X8].
75 I.R.C. § 163.
69
70
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is the end of it. These two possible scenarios lead to more interesting tax
results than if Revlon merely pays back the loan at the original terms.
Consider the second possibility—that Revlon took the position that
subrogation did not apply and therefore the loan was simply wiped off
the books because Citibank paid it. Was this a likely position for Citibank
to take after the mistaken payment? Commentators have noted that there
is not much legal precedent in this type of situation and so perhaps it is
unclear whether subrogation would apply.76 However, if Revlon took
such a position, it would have to be required to recognize Citibank’s
payment of the loan as income.77 Citibank paid off Revlon’s liability
which was clearly income to Revlon.78 In fact, if Revlon did not report
the loan payment as income when Citibank made the mistaken payment,
it could diminish the strength of its position that subrogation did not
apply. Citibank could point out that, for tax purposes, Revlon acted as if
the loan was still valid. Assume, however, that a court sided with Revlon
and ruled that subrogation did not apply. As noted above, Revlon would
have income but what would be the tax results to Citibank? Citibank
should have received a business deduction for the mistaken payment.
Although in the past courts have denied deductions for paying off
someone else’s loan,79 this should qualify for a business expense
deduction under Internal Revenue Code section 162 or a deductible loss
under section 165.80
76 See Jeremy Hill & Eliza Ronalds-Hannon, Citi’s $900 Million Revlon Gaffe Risks Getting
Even More Painful, BLOOMBERG (June 16, 2022, 3:27 PM) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2022-06-16/citi-s-900-million-revlon-gaffe-risks-getting-even-more-painful
[https://perma.cc/XJV3-YUUL]. The article quotes Columbia University Law Professor Eric
Talley, who states that “[t]here isn’t a lot of law on this.” Id.
77 There is one possible argument to avoid income recognition. If Citibank owns Revlon stock,
Revlon could argue that the payment was a nontaxable contribution of capital. I.R.C. § 118. That
is, Citibank contributed the money to Revlon thereby increasing its basis in its Revlon stock. I.R.C.
§ 362. Revlon then used those funds to pay off the loan.
78 See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929) (“The discharge by a third
person of an obligation to him is equivalent to receipt by the person taxed.”).
79 Internal Revenue Code section 162 allows a taxpayer to deduct “ordinary and necessary
expenses” incurred in a trade or business. I.R.C. § 162. In the landmark case of Welch v. Helvering,
the Court held that it was not “ordinary” to pay off the debt of someone else. 290 U.S. 111, 114
(1933) (“Men do at times pay the debts of others without legal obligation or the lighter obligation
imposed by the usages of trade or by neighborly amendities, but they do not do so ordinarily, not
even though the result might be to heighten their reputation for generosity and opulence.”). The
Court therefore denied the taxpayer a deduction for paying off the debt of a bankrupt corporation.
Id. at 116–17. This opinion has been criticized. See Conley v. Comm’r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1644
(1977); see also KAHN & KAHN, supra note 3, at 506–07. Some courts have modified the Welch
holding by ruling that payment of another’s liability is deductible if it was done to promote their
own ongoing business. See Dietrick v. Comm’r, 881 F.2d 336, 339 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Jenkins
v. Comm’r, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 238, 246 (1983)).
80 KAHN & KAHN, supra note 3, at 506–07. In this situation, the argument for deduction is even
stronger since there is no contention that the mistaken payment should be capitalized rather than
deducted. This distinction (expense vs. capitalization) is the more proper determination to be made
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On the other hand, assume subrogation kicked in but Revlon does
not begin to pay Citibank back because of its bankruptcy. Under this
scenario, the income tax results are slightly different. Here, normally
Citibank would get a deduction for the amount not paid back from Revlon
as it would qualify for a bad debt deduction.81 However, such a deduction
may have to be delayed until the lawsuit with lenders was concluded since
such lawsuit would provide a reasonable possibility that Citibank would
be “repaid” and it would not be bad debt.
Revlon would realize income in the amount of debt that is canceled,
but it might not have to recognize the income under the exception for
insolvent taxpayers or taxpayers in Chapter 11.82 Note this treatment
should apply even with the Citibank lawsuit since that lawsuit had no
bearing on whether Revlon could make its debt payments, it would only
affect to whom Revlon owed the money (that it still could not afford to
pay). Under this treatment, although the immediate recognition of income
would be avoided, Revlon would have to reduce its beneficial tax
attributes to the extent of the nonrecognition of cancellation of debt
income so it is not a pure exclusion.83
Assuming Revlon did not actually have the financial means to pay
Citibank back for the loan, it is surprisingly preferable (for federal tax
purposes) for Revlon to take the position that subrogation applied when
Citibank mistakenly paid the lenders. As noted above, if subrogation did
not apply, then Revlon had income equal to the payoff amount since
Citibank paid off its loan. As this is not considered “cancellation of debt”
for tax purposes,84 there is no exclusion or nonrecognition provision that
would apply and allow Revlon to avoid the immediate income
recognition. Even if Revlon was insolvent or in Chapter 11 bankruptcy,
if the position was that Citibank paid off the loan and Revlon did not owe
anything to anyone, Revlon must include the payment in income.
However, if the position was that Citibank merely stepped into the shoes
of the creditors when it mistakenly paid Revlon’s loan (that is,
subrogation applies), then the loan still exists on Revlon’s books and
when determining whether an expense was “ordinary” within the meaning of Internal Revenue
Code section 162. Comm’r v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966). See also KAHN & KAHN, supra
note 3, at 505–06.
81 I.R.C. § 166.
82 I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(A)–(B). Technically, section 108 is an “exclusion” provision, not a
nonrecognition provision. However, since it is possible that the excluded cancellation of debt
income will reduce favorable tax attributes, it is possible the exclusion will not be an actual
exclusion at all, but merely a deferral of recognizing the income which fits the nonrecognition label.
Of course, if the taxpayer has no favorable tax attributes to reduce (an unlikely situation since the
taxpayer will be required to reduce their basis in their assets if they do not have other favorable tax
attributes) then the provision is a true exclusion. See KAHN & KAHN, supra note 3, at 159.
83 I.R.C. § 108(b); see also KAHN & KAHN, supra note 3, at 152–53.
84 This would be considered a satisfaction of the debt by another party.
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there was no income effect at that moment. Instead, when the loan was
canceled (or reduced) in bankruptcy, the cancellation of debt exception
would kick in and Revlon would not be required to report the cancellation
of the debt as income. 85 Instead, as noted above, it would have to reduce
some of its favorable tax attributes.86 Although not a pure exclusion, this
is likely better than the immediate recognition and inclusion of income.
B.

Possibility 1: Citibank Victory Holds

The next two sections review what happens for tax purposes once
the Citibank litigation is concluded. The tax results are fairly simple if
Citibank’s Second Circuit victory holds and the lenders return the
mistaken payment. Assuming the lenders have the funds to return what
was paid, there would be essentially no income tax result to any of the
parties for returning the money. The lenders do not get any deduction
because they merely step back into their position as a creditor on the
original Revlon loan. Other than any deemed interest, the claim of right
rule also does not apply. The claim of right rule is a tax doctrine that
requires taxpayers to include a payment in income upon receipt, but
allows that taxpayer a deduction if, in a later tax year, they are required
to return the payment and they do return it.87 This doctrine is inapplicable
to the lenders since they never included the mistaken payment in income
(other than the amounts considered interest). Citibank does not have
income since it is merely getting back what it paid out in mistake.88
For Revlon, the tax results depend on the position that Revlon took
when the debt was mistakenly paid. If Revlon took the position that
Citibank discharged the loan and subrogation did not apply, Revlon
should have recognized income at the time of the payment on account of
Citibank paying off its liability. If the lenders return the funds to Citibank,
then Revlon is back on the hook for the loan. The returning of the money
to Citibank (and the reconstitution of the loan) would appear to be a
situation where the claim of right rule should apply. 89 Internal Revenue

I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(A)–(B).
I.R.C. § 108(b).
87 See KAHN & KAHN, supra note 3, at 176.
88 This assumes Citibank did not take an income tax deduction for the payment in the year of
the mistaken payment. If Citibank did take a deduction (and assuming the deduction provided
Citibank a tax benefit), it will have income for the return of the funds under the tax benefit rule.
I.R.C. § 111. See Dobson v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 489 (1943).
89 I use the word “appear” because this is not your typical claim of right situation. The typical
claim of right scenario is where a taxpayer receives money (whether by mistake or otherwise). In a
later tax year, the taxpayer has an obligation to return the money and does so. Under general tax
principles, the taxpayer would have income in the year it received the money and a deduction when
it returned it. See KAHN & KAHN, supra note 3, at 176. Revlon’s situation is a bit unusual because
85
86
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Code section 1341 should apply to provide tax relief to Revlon. Under
Internal Revenue Code section 1341, Revlon would either get a credit for
the amount of taxes that they paid on the income that they reported for
having the debt satisfied by Citibank, or Revlon would get a deduction
equal to the amount of money that is returned to Citibank.90 The taxpayer
takes whichever option produces the lower tax liability in the year of the
inconsistent event.91
However, if Revlon did not report the mistaken loan payment as
income and instead held the position that subrogation applied then, as
noted above, it continues to owe money, but now it owed Citibank instead
of the lenders. Under this scenario, there are no tax consequences to
Revlon when the lenders return the funds to Citibank. The debt merely
shifts back to the lenders instead of Citibank. This is a nonevent for
income tax purposes. With Revlon declaring bankruptcy, it may not have
the funds to pay off the loan. If the loan is cancelled (or reduced) during
bankruptcy, that would be income to Revlon although the
insolvency/bankruptcy exception may kick in to allow Revlon to avoid
recognition of income, but still reduce beneficial tax attributes to the
extent they avoided income.92 The lenders would be allowed a bad debt
deduction for whatever is not paid to them.93
C.

Possibility 2: The Supreme Court Reverses

Although unlikely, what are the tax results if the Supreme Court
reviews the case, reverses the Second Circuit, and reinstates the lenders’
victory? For the lenders, there are no tax consequences. They would be
entitled to keep the funds that they received from Citibank, but since
those funds were payments for a loan, there was no tax consequence for
their receipt (other than the amount representing interest). A court victory
entitling the lenders to keep the funds would be a nonevent for tax
purposes to the lenders.
For Revlon, a reversal would also be a nonevent for tax purposes. If
Revlon’s position was that subrogation did not apply (and therefore it had
it never actually received any money; Citibank merely paid off its liability and then the liability
returns when a court rules that the lenders have to give the money back. Still, the principle of the
claim of right rule applies to this situation, and the payment of the liability is similar to receiving
money, so the doctrine should apply.
90 I.R.C. § 1341(a)(4)–(5).
91 I.R.C. § 1341(a).
92 See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text.
93 I.R.C. § 166. The bad debt deduction is for “debts which become worthless in whole or in
part . . . ” Treas. Reg. § 1.166-1(a)(1). The regulations also state that the “fact that a bad debt is not
due at the time of its deduction shall not of itself prevent its allowance under section 166.” Treas.
Reg. § 1.166-1(c).

188

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE NOVO

[Vol. 44

recognized income on account of the Citibank debt payment), a lender
victory would have no bearing on that income tax position and there
would be no tax consequences to Revlon for the tax year that the lenders
victory is finalized. If Revlon took the position that subrogation applied
and it owed the debt to Citibank at the same terms as the lenders, it still
appears that a lender victory would not have any effect on Revlon’s
immediate income tax position. If the debt had been reduced or canceled
in bankruptcy, the tax consequences of that would have already been
applied. Finalizing that the debt, after the mistaken payment, was owed
to Citibank, rather than lenders, would not alter those consequences,
whether all or only some of the debt was canceled in bankruptcy.
Citibank is the one party that would be affected by such a reversal.
Citibank may not have deducted the mistaken payment because there was
a reasonable possibility that the money would be returned. A final lender
victory would eliminate the possibility that Citibank would be getting any
money from the lenders. Therefore, if Revlon was also not going to pay
Citibank (either because subrogation did not apply or because Revlon had
the debt reduced or canceled in bankruptcy) then Citibank would be
entitled to deduction either as a loss, bad debt, or general business
expense. 94
CONCLUSION
Mistakes happen, but our sympathy for those that make them does
not change the tax consequences. This piece has set out the possible tax
consequences whichever way the courts end up ruling in the Citibank
case. While corporate law scholars are watching the case with interest,
the Internal Revenue Service may also be watching to see what ends up
being the final tax consequences for all three of the parties involved.

94

See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text.

